Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail of Tears”? by Tweedy, Ann
Georgia State University Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 3 Spring 2021 Article 4 
8-1-2021 
Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail 
of Tears”? 
Ann Tweedy 
University of South Dakota School of Law, ann.tweedy@usd.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr 
 Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ann Tweedy, Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail of Tears”?, 37 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 739 (2021). 
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more 
information, please contact gfowke@gsu.edu. 
 
739 
HAS FEDERAL INDIAN LAW FINALLY ARRIVED 
AT “THE FAR END OF THE TRAIL OF TEARS”?† 
Ann E. Tweedy 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the United States Supreme Court’s July 9, 2020 
decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that the historic boundaries of 
the Creek reservation remain intact, and argues that the decision may signal 
a sea change in the course of federal Indian law of the magnitude of 
Obergefell v. Hodges in the LGBT rights arena. The Article shows how the 
opinion lays a very strong foundation for a much-needed return to traditional 
federal Indian law principles, respectful treatment of tribal governments as 
a third sovereign in the American system, and an understanding of fairness 
from the perspective of tribes and Native individuals. The possible effects of 
Justice Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg on the Court’s future 
federal Indian law jurisprudence are also explored. The Article concludes 
with the hope that Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion will foster 
predictability in the wildly unstable area of diminishment and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court issued its opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma on 
July 9, 2020,1 ruling in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch that 
the three million-acre Creek reservation in Eastern Oklahoma had not 
been disestablished and thus that its historical boundaries remained 
intact.2 Although the case itself resulted from an application for 
post-conviction relief brought by an individual who had been 
convicted of child sexual abuse, the reason that it was so closely 
watched was because Mr. McGirt’s argument about Oklahoma’s lack 
of jurisdiction over him depended on the continuing reservation status 
of the Creek Nation’s historical reservation.3 
The Indian law bar had nervously anticipated the long-awaited 
decision.4 In a highly unusual turn of events, a predecessor case, Sharp 
v. Murphy, from which Justice Gorsuch recused himself, was argued 
in November 2018.5 After additional briefing was ordered, the case 
was held over for reargument in the following term.6 The order for 
additional briefing and the subsequent holding over of the case spurred 
speculation that the Justices were split 4–4 in Sharp.7 The Court 
 
 1. 140 S. Ct. at 2452. 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 153–54 (7th ed. 2020). 
When Congress has disestablished a reservation, it is no longer legally considered a reservation, and the 
special jurisdictional rules that apply on reservations no longer obtain. Id. Similarly, when Congress has 
diminished a reservation, the boundaries have been shrunk; in other words, the reservation status of part 
of the lands has been extinguished. Id. 
 3. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459–60 (noting that the Creek Nation appeared as amicus curiae “because 
Mr. McGirt’s personal interests [wound] up implicating the Tribe’s”); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 




 4. See, e.g., Acee Agoyo, Still No Sign of Supreme Court Arguments in Closely-Watched Indian 
Country Case, INDIANZ.COM (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.indianz.com/News/2019/11/11/still-no-sign-
of-supreme-court-arguments.asp [https://perma.cc/VVR2-Y4RV]. 
 5. 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (per curiam); see also Agoyo, supra note 4. 
 6. Christopher Coble, Carpenter v. Murphy: The Case the Justices Couldn’t Decide, FINDLAW: U.S. 
SUP. CT. NEWS BLOG (July 9, 2019, 3:04 PM), 
https://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2019/07/carpenter-v-murphy-the-case-the-justices-couldnt-
decide.html [https://perma.cc/D25T-P6LD]. The case was finally decided after McGirt. See generally 
Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412. 
 7. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 113 (2020); 
Coble, supra note 6. 
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originally scheduled the argument in McGirt (whose issues mirrored 
those in Sharp) for April 2020 but then postponed it until May because 
of the coronavirus pandemic.8 Additionally, the Justices’ questions and 
comments during the oral arguments in both cases did not provide a 
clear indication of which way the Court was leaning, although some 
saw the argument questions in Sharp as being more favorable to 
Oklahoma.9 
Would the Supreme Court’s doctrine in the area of diminishment 
and disestablishment become more incoherent because of a new 
results-oriented decision, or would the Court hew to the bright line it 
had recently re-inscribed in Nebraska v. Parker,10 despite the fact that 
that the historic Creek Reservation was much more populous—and 
thus home to many more non-Indians in terms of hard numbers—than 
the historic Omaha Reservation whose boundaries were held to be 
intact in Parker? Until well into July 2020, past June 30th (the date at 
which the Court normally issues its last decisions for the term and then 
breaks for recess),11 it was anyone’s guess. 
In the popular understanding, the McGirt opinion is viewed as 
remarkable for its practical effect—over three million acres in 
Oklahoma are now understood to be an Indian reservation, despite the 
fact that many people assumed the reservation to be defunct and 
merely a relic of history.12 But, from the viewpoint of a federal Indian 
 
 8. See Press Release, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_04-13-20 [https://perma.cc/Y4LQ-
E8KV]. 
 9. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Ronald Mann, 
Argument Analysis: For the Second Time in Two Terms, Justices Consider Reservation Status of Eastern 
Oklahoma, SCOTUS BLOG (May 12, 2020, 4:24 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/argument-
analysis-for-the-second-time-in-two-terms-justices-consider-reservation-status-of-eastern-oklahoma/ 
[https://perma.cc/PSR3-2RC7]; Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious About Ramifications 
of Broad Indian Reservation in Oklahoma, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 27, 2018, 6:24 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-about-ramifications-of-broad-
indian-reservation-in-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/W6UT-C4ET]. 
 10. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
 11. See, e.g., FAQs: Announcements of Orders and Opinions, SCOTUS BLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/faqs-announcements-of-orders-and-opinions/ [https://perma.cc/SL67-
LGTT]. 
 12. See, e.g., Richard Wolf & Kevin Johnson, Supreme Court Says Eastern Oklahoma Remains Native 
American Territory, USA TODAY: POLITICS, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/09/
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law scholar, the opinion is remarkable for its straightforwardness and 
dearth of post hoc rationales.13 In other words, the McGirt decision is 
unusual in contemporary federal Indian law because it is a Supreme 
Court decision that hews closely to both traditional federal Indian law 
principles and general statutory interpretation principles, eschewing 
the approach that many Supreme Court cases have taken from the 
Rehnquist Court onwards of trying to shut down the exercise of tribal 
sovereignty wherever possible, no matter how flimsy or novel the 
proffered justification for doing so.14 The McGirt decision is also 
noteworthy for its respectful tone vis-à-vis tribes and tribal 
sovereignty. 
Although the recent addition of Justice Barrett to the Court 
following Justice Ginsburg’s death creates a great deal of uncertainty, 
the opinion may signal a return to the relatively predictable and 
well-reasoned federal Indian law jurisprudence that we more 
commonly saw in Supreme Court cases from the late 1950s to the 
mid-1970s, as well as in some cases decided in the 1980s.15 In terms 
 
supreme-court-allows-native-american-jurisdiction-half-oklahoma/3208778001/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BHR-QRVT] (July 9, 2020, 1:57 PM); see also Robert J. Miller & Torey Dolan, The 
Indian Law Bombshell: McGirt v. Oklahoma, 101 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 31) 
(on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (“Oklahoma and Oklahomans had assumed and 
operated for over 100 years as if there was no Creek Reservation.”). 
 13. Accord Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian 
Law, a Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 90, 
96–97 (2002); see also Joy Harjo, After a Trail of Tears, Justice for ‘Indian Country,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 
14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/opinion/mcgirt-oklahoma-muscogee-creek-nation.html 
[https://perma.cc/2KNB-JU4N]. 
 14. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, 
and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 677–83 (2009) [hereinafter Tweedy, Connecting the Dots]; 
Ann E. Tweedy, Indian Tribes and Gun Regulation: Should Tribes Exercise Their Sovereign Rights to 
Enact Gun Bans or Stand-Your-Ground Laws?, 78 ALB. L. REV. 885, 897 (2015) [hereinafter Tweedy, 
Indian Tribes]; Leah Jurss, Halting the “Slide down the Sovereignty Slope”: Creative Remedies for Tribes 
Extending Civil Infraction Systems over Non-Indians, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 39, 49–54 (2015). 
Although the Supreme Court has had a decidedly mixed record in its dealings with tribes over time (with 
its level of openness to tribal rights having been subject to vast shifts that often correlate with the 
congressional policy of the day), the period beginning during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure and 
continuing in some measure into the present has been characterized by hostility to tribal rights that 
contravenes—and even may constitute an attempt to undo—congressional policy. See, e.g., ROBERT T. 
ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES & COMMENTARY 77–78, 153–54 (4th ed. 2020). 
 15. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 
411 U.S. 164 (1973); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); New Mexico v. 
 
5
Tweedy: Federal Indian Law
Published by Reading Room, 2021
744 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
of tone, the decision is unusual in that it takes into account fairness 
concerns from the Creek Nation’s perspective,16 and it enforces as a 
solemn obligation Congress’s historical promises to the Nation. Thus, 
rather than playing the all-too-common role of “court as the 
conqueror,”17 the Court’s decision attempts to do justice by applying 
the relevant legal principles in a straightforward manner, properly 
recognizing that Congress—and not the Court—has plenary power in 
the area of Indian affairs.18 In taking this approach, the Court overtly 
rejects the oft-recited notion that widespread past injustices inflicted 
on a tribe and then relied upon by non-Natives make it impossible to 
rule in favor of a tribe in a contemporary case.19 The McGirt majority 
instead proclaims, forthrightly and powerfully, that “[u]nlawful acts, 
performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to 
amend the law.”20 
In the context of the Supreme Court’s federal Indian law 
jurisprudence, which had become so unstable and so frequently hostile 
to tribal rights in recent years that attorneys who represent tribes very 
 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 
(1989); Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska 
v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2017) (describing 
Court decisions in federal Indian law authored by the previous generation of progressive Justices).  
 16. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 (noting that the Court often “appears 
unwilling to give tribal interests genuine weight or to make the effort necessary to grasp the genuine 
import of tribal interests”); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Sovereignty over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1999) (noting the 
one-sidedness of the Court’s perception of fairness in diminishment and disestablishment cases generally); 
accord Fletcher, supra note 7, at 114 (“Justice Gorsuch appears to be the rare judge who takes seriously 
the views of Indian tribes in interpreting Indian law.”). 
 17. Frickey, supra note 16, at 73. 
 18. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect both for 
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly 
in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.” (first citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 
199–200 (1975); and then citing Choate v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 675 (1912))). 
 19. Accord Bethany R. Berger, McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Past, Present, and Future of Reservation 
Boundaries, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 29–32), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3694051 (describing the frequency with which 
states violated federal law by asserting authority over reservations during and after the allotment period 
and noting that “McGirt finally ended the practice of relying on historical exercises of state jurisdiction 
as evidence of reservation diminishment”); see also Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying 
to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 155 & n.134 (2012). 
 20. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020). 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4
2021] FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 745 
often would “try to avoid the Supreme Court at all costs,”21 the 
decision, including both its tone and substance, feels like a sea change 
equal to the magnitude of Obergefell v. Hodges and the historic sex 
discrimination case Reed v. Reed.22 By way of background, the 
Obergefell Court’s decision in 2015 that the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect an individual’s 
right to enter into a same-sex marriage (as well as a different-sex one) 
emphatically affirmed that LGBT individuals were deserving of the 
same legal benefits and protections as others and thereby broke with 
over a century of precedent disparaging LGBT persons, criminalizing 
their sexual conduct, and denying them the rights that others enjoyed.23 
And the Supreme Court’s dramatic disavowal in its 1971 decision in 
Reed of the patriarchal notion that the law could, consistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause, automatically prefer men over women for 
important roles like the administration of estates destabilized centuries 
of enshrinement of male privilege in the American legal tradition, 
including the vestiges of the long-held conception of women as 
property, and caused our entire legal framework to shift a bit toward 
equality of the sexes.24 
Similarly, the McGirt decision is a powerful affirmation of rights 
too often ignored and disparaged in the Supreme Court and elsewhere 
in our culture.25 On one level, it is about upholding and enforcing a 
treaty promise.26 But, by recognizing that the promises the government 
made in exchange for its heart-wrenching demands were meaningful, 
the Court also implicitly acknowledges that the Creek Nation’s 
sacrifices—including their brutal, forced relocation to present-day 
Oklahoma, an area far from their traditional territory in the 
 
 21. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REV. 
777, 777 (2006). 
 22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015) (recognizing the constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971) (holding that state laws may not use a party’s gender as a basis to 
discriminate among candidates for administration of a decedent’s estate).  
 23. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1551 (1993). 
 24. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71. 
 25. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2452. 
 26. Id. at 2459. 
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southeastern United States—were meaningful as well.27 Thus, as poet 
laureate Joy Harjo commented, the McGirt decision is actually “about 
so much more” than the enforcement of a single treaty promise.28 “It 
[is] about validity, personhood, humanity—the assertion of our human 
rights as Indigenous peoples and our right to exist.”29 In other words, 
the decision represents an all too rare instance when a tribe was heard 
in the Supreme Court and was treated with dignity and respect rather 
than being disparaged or recoiled from in fear.30 
I. THE CONFOUNDING JURISPRUDENCE OF RESERVATION 
DIMINISHMENT AND DISESTABLISHMENT AS A CONTRAST TO THE 
MAJORITY’S SOUND AND INTERNALLY CONSISTENT REASONING IN 
MCGIRT 
A. The Confounding Jurisprudence of Reservation Diminishment 
and Disestablishment 
The Supreme Court’s diminishment and disestablishment 
jurisprudence has been inconsistent at best, with one highly respected 
scholar suggesting that the Court’s “judicial method” in these cases 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Harjo, supra note 13. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7, at 133 (“Throughout the Indian law canon, Indian people are 
referred to as ‘incompetents,’ ‘wards,’ unlettered, people without laws, uncivilized heathens, and so on. 
Regardless of the language used, the Court’s Indian affairs jurisprudence depends on the presumed 
inferiority of Indian people.” (first quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945); then 
quoting Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983); then citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 
380–81 (1908); and then citing Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 62 (1906))). The December 2015 oral 
argument in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per 
curiam), represents an example of the Court recoiling in fear from the prospect of tribal jurisdiction over 
a non-member business. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1937–38 (describing the oral argument and 
noting that the argument devolved into “a blood bath” when the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians’ 
attorney stepped up to the podium). Although the “blood bath” scene that Berger describes seems to be 
more rooted in anger than fear, anger is actually predicated on other emotions that are connected to 
vulnerability—one of the most common of which is fear. See, e.g., Paul Thagard, How Fear Leads to 
Anger: Emotions Cause Other Emotions, As When People’s Fears Cause Them to Be Angry., PSYCH. 
TODAY: HOT THOUGHT (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hot-
thought/201811/how-fear-leads-anger [https://perma.cc/DA3S-T2G8]; Leon F. Seltzer, What Your Anger 
May Be Hiding: Reflections on the Most Seductive—and Addictive—of Human Emotions., PSYCH. TODAY: 
EVOLUTION OF THE SELF (July 11, 2008), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-
self/200807/what-your-anger-may-be-hiding [https://perma.cc/N6XR-KTH9]. 
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has the appearance of being “essentially lawless.”31 This inconsistency 
may be due, in part, to the view of some Justices, at least historically, 
that adhering to precedent was less critical—or even optional—in the 
field of federal Indian law. For example, the late Justice Scalia once 
wrote approvingly in an internal memorandum: 
[O]ur opinions in th[e] field [of Indian law] have not posited 
an original state of affairs that can subsequently be altered 
only by explicit legislation, but have rather sought to discern 
what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into 
account all legislation, and the congressional “expectations” 
that it reflects, down to the present day.32 
For Justice Scalia, this realization served as the basis to depart from 
his planned course of joining Justices Brennan and Marshall in their 
dissent in Duro v. Reina,33 in which they argued that the Court should 
have supported the Salt River Pima Maricopa Tribe’s interest in 
maintaining law and order on its reservation; Justice Scalia’s 
realization therefore justified his decision to instead join the majority 
opinion in that case and also appeared to influence his decisions in 
subsequent federal Indian law cases.34 Justice Scalia later casually 
acknowledged his free-wheeling approach to federal Indian law at a 
book signing, where he told a young Native woman who mentioned 
that her family had had a federal Indian law case go up to the Supreme 
Court when she was in elementary school: “You know, when it comes 
to Indian law, most of the time we’re just making it up.”35 
 
 31. Frickey, supra note 16, at 24; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121 (“[T]he outcomes of 
reservation boundaries disputes are unpredictable if not completely random.”); Fletcher, supra note 3; 
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (describing the Court’s 
then-current approach to diminishment and disestablishment cases as “essentially ad hoc”). 
 32. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 698 n.238 (citing Frickey, supra note 16, at 63). 
 33. 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
 34. See Frickey, supra note 16, at 62–63; see also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 686 
n.168 (collecting sources that connect the Court’s decisions in Duro and other cases that divested tribes 
of jurisdiction to problems of lawlessness on reservations). 
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Justice Scalia’s untethered approach to cases involving tribes 
contrasted with his much more constrained originalist and textualist 
approach in other areas of the law.36 And his Indian law approach was 
all the more surprising because, outside of the context of federal Indian 
law, he frequently chastised other Justices for applying what he 
perceived as their own values to resolve cases rather than focusing 
solely on the Framers’ intent as to constitutional issues or legislative 
intent, as discerned from statutory language, in statutory cases.37 
Thus, we have one prominent (and purportedly anti-activist) former 
Justice openly espousing the view that precedent has less force in 
federal Indian law and that he and other Justices were free to disregard 
it whenever they believed doing so was warranted. Whether or not 
other Supreme Court Justices would have (or currently do) explicitly 
subscribe to this view, the body of diminishment and disestablishment 
cases suggests that some do so and that some previous Justices have 
done so, at least in practice. 
To briefly summarize the background for the question at issue in 
McGirt, diminishment and disestablishment cases examine whether a 
reservation has been partially or fully extinguished because of a 
congressional decision to sell off some reservation lands to 
homesteaders during a period of history when the government’s policy 
was to forcibly assimilate tribal citizens into mainstream American 
culture by violating tribal rights and abolishing tribal communal 
property ownership.38 Diminishment and disestablishment questions 
normally turn on whether a statute allowing for the allotment of a 
 
 36. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia & the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 747–50 
(2017); cf. Craig S. Lerner, Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Failure of 
Sake-of-Argument Originalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 96–97 (2019) (noting that Justice 
Scalia’s approach to the Eighth Amendment was not purely originalist because he did at times defer to 
non-originalist precedent). Even more strikingly, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), 
Justice Scalia embraced a non-originalist view of the Second Amendment (while maintaining that it was 
rooted in originalism). Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 238–40, 240 n.250 (2008). 
 37. See, e.g., Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision’s 
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L.J. 
1689, 1705 n.134 (1994); Fletcher, supra note 7, at 117. See generally J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful 
Dissent: Justice Scalia’s Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201 (2017). 
 38. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 19, at 130, 136. 
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specific reservation and the sale of “surplus lands”39 to non-members 
had the effect of eliminating the reservation status of the whole body 
of reservation lands or of shrinking the reservation (usually in such a 
way that the so-called surplus lands would no longer be considered 
included within reservation boundaries).40 Reservation status, in turn, 
generally means that, for criminal cases involving Native Americans 
as victims or defendants, the federal government, and in some cases, 
the tribe (rather than the state)41 will have jurisdiction. Reservation 
status also affects civil jurisdiction to some extent, but the contours of 
these effects are much less predictable.42 
For the past few decades, the Court has used the three-step analysis 
laid out in Solem v. Bartlett to determine whether a given reservation 
has been diminished or disestablished,43 but it has not been consistent 
about how and when the latter steps apply.44 Besides this 
inconsistency, another problem with the Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area is that it seems to impose a “magic language” requirement in the 
first step,45 which addresses statutory language and congressional 
intent, but it sometimes appears to expand the universe of qualifying 
magic language in an outcome-determinative manner.46 
 
 39. The lands considered “surplus” were those lands not allotted to tribal members. See, e.g., id. at 
134. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 134, 143–44. 
 41. However, a few states have been explicitly granted criminal jurisdiction over reservations within 
their borders under a federal law referred to as Public Law 280. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 
67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1162, 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26); see 
also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 694. 
 42. See, e.g., Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at 893–99. 
 43. 465 U.S. 463, 472, 476, 478 (1984). 
 44. See, e.g., Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining that the Supreme Court first laid out 
the three-part test in Solem); Frickey, supra note 16, at 24, 26 (acknowledging that “[t]aken as a whole, 
the judicial method in the diminishment cases might appear to be essentially lawless” and noting that “a 
reading of these cases suggests . . . a casual, unreflective concession to non-Indian instincts”); Fletcher, 
supra note 7, at 120–21 (noting that, after Solem, “nothing [besides the fact that the three-part test would 
be applied in some fashion] was certain or predictable in how these cases would be decided”).  
 45. See Frickey, supra note 16, at 18. The term “magic language” refers to the fact that the Court 
parses very similar statutory terms relating to tribal cession of the surplus lands differently in terms of 
whether they are read to effect diminishment or disestablishment. See id. Thus, a layperson reading the 
statutes that have been held to effect diminishment and those that have been held not to effect 
diminishment might very well conclude that they all say basically the same thing. See id. 
 46. Id. at 24, 26. 
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The three steps are: (1) the statutory language itself; (2) the 
legislative history and the course of negotiations with the relevant tribe 
or tribes (also sometimes referred to as “surrounding circumstances”); 
and finally, (3) post-enactment history, including the demographics of 
the contested area.47 Theoretically, it is only when a statute is 
ambiguous that a court should move on to analyzing the less probative 
information adduced from steps two and three,48 but, in practice, the 
Court has sometimes used the latter steps—especially the third—to 
support holdings of diminishment that seemed to run contrary to the 
statutory language.49 However, adhering closely to Congress’s intent 
is extremely important in the federal Indian law context because 
Congress is the branch of the federal government that has been held to 
have plenary power over tribes and because one of the foundational 
principles of Indian law is that tribes retain their sovereign powers 
(except those like treaty-making power with foreign nations that would 
be inconsistent with their position within the United States), unless 
Congress has explicitly acted to remove the power at issue.50 Thus, 
diminishment and disestablishment, like the abrogation of other treaty 
rights, should not be lightly inferred. Instead, to hold a treaty right to 
be abrogated, a court needs to find “clear and plain” evidence that 
Congress considered the conflict between its proposed action and the 
treaty right and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty 
right.51 Thus, when the Court relies on steps two and three in the 
absence of at least ambiguous statutory language suggesting intent to 
abrogate tribal rights in step one, it violates its own overarching Indian 
law principles. 
The earliest diminishment cases undertook a more holistic analysis 
of the statutory language to determine whether it genuinely 
 
 47. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04[3] (2020) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 48. See id. (noting that a statutory ambiguity is required to move on to step two); Frickey, supra note 
16, at 18 (discussing the Court’s decision in Solem, 465 U.S. 463); see also Royster, supra note 31, at 30–
31 (discussing early diminishment and disestablishment cases, in which the Court focused primarily on 
the language of the surplus land acts themselves). 
 49. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–26; see also Fletcher, supra note 3; Royster, supra note 31, at 34–
36 (discussing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)). 
 50. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 71–72; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 123; see also Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (alluding to Congress’s plenary power in Indian Affairs). 
 51. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–40 (1986); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 1921. 
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demonstrated that Congress clearly intended to terminate reservation 
status for all or part of the reservation lands.52 Starting in the 
mid-1970s, however, the Court began to conclude that language 
indicating an intent for a tribe to cede lands unconditionally to the 
United States for a sum certain was sufficient to support a judicial 
inference of an intent to diminish or disestablish a reservation.53 The 
Court later expanded this universe of so-called magic language to 
include run-of-the-mill language that “restor[ed] land to the public 
domain.”54 As I have argued elsewhere, the Court’s contemporary 
enforcement of statutes—based on the intent of the Congress that 
passed the statute so as to implement a repudiated and “disastrous” 
policy aimed at assimilating tribes, usually against their wills 55—is 
artificial and unjust.56 Nonetheless, if this is the course that the Court 
has determined to take, one would hope that at least it would be 
undertaken in a consistent manner in order to imbue highly significant 
questions of continued reservation status with some level of 
predictability. Instead, however, the Court’s diminishment and 
disestablishment jurisprudence has often seemed confoundingly 
inconsistent.57 
One recent case that seemed poised to reinscribe much-needed 
clarity to diminishment and disestablishment jurisprudence was a 
unanimous 2016 opinion called Nebraska v. Parker.58 Although 
diminishment and disestablishment cases are invariably contentious, 
this case was arguably relatively uncontroversial because it involved 
the validity of a tribal law requiring a tribal liquor license to engage in 
on-reservation liquor sales, and such tribal laws are explicitly 
 
 52. See, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973); Royster, supra note 31, at 30–31. 
 53. DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975); Frickey, supra note 
16, at 18–19. 
 54. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–19, 21 (discussing earlier cases in conjunction with Hagen v. Utah, 
510 U.S. 399 (1994)); see also Royster, supra note 31, at 30–31 (discussing early diminishment cases). 
 55. Frickey, supra note 16, at 15, 25. 
 56. See, e.g., Ann E. Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment & 
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 193–94 (2000). 
 57. Frickey, supra note 16, at 24; see also Fletcher, supra note 3; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121. 
 58. 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1076 (2016); see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 121 (noting that Parker “seemed 
to put an end to much of [the] nonsense” evident in prior reservation boundary cases). 
13
Tweedy: Federal Indian Law
Published by Reading Room, 2021
752 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
sanctioned under federal law.59 Additionally, the federal statute 
sanctioning application of tribal law had been upheld as a valid 
delegation to Indian tribes over forty years before.60 Perhaps in part 
because of these relatively tame facts61—and despite the fact that the 
Supreme Court’s federal Indian law decisions are very often fractured 
and that tribes generally lose,62 especially when state or non-member 
interests are implicated63—Parker was a unanimous decision in favor 
of the Omaha Tribe. In a twelve-page-opinion, the Court determined, 
primarily based on the text of the statute under which the disputed 
parcel, now containing the Village of Pender and the establishments to 
which the Omaha Tribe was attempting to apply its liquor licensing 
requirements, that Congress had not diminished the reservation.64 
The 1882 Act at issue in the case authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to survey and sell tracts of reservation land to non-members.65 
It contained none of the magic language (or “hallmarks,” as Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion more charitably termed the required 
words) indicating complete and total surrender of tribal interests; and 
because the parcels were to be sold off on a piecemeal basis, the Act 
did not provide for “sum certain” compensation to the Tribe by the 
federal government.66 The second factor, relating to the legislative 
history of the Act and the course of negotiations with the Tribe, was 
 
 59. Parker, 577 U.S. at 486 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1161). 
 60. See generally United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
 61. Additionally, amicus briefs submitted to the Court detailing unfairness in the allotment process 
with respect to these particular lands may have had some influence on the Court. See Berger, supra note 
15, at 1923–24. 
 62. See Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 
63 TAX LAW. 897, 996 n.380 (2010); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1190 (2001). 
 63. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, 
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 268, 281 (2001); see also Berger, 
supra note 15, at 1906–07; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 130, 135 (noting that “tribal assertions of power over 
non-members attract the Court’s attention” and that, for Indians and tribes, “the numerous biases of the 
judiciary make every case a presumptive loser”). The Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in United 
States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021), like the decisions in McGirt and Parker, is an important deviation 
from this bleak principle and supports the idea that McGirt may well signal a sea change. At the very least, 
we now know that McGirt was not simply an aberration.  
 64. Parker, 577 U.S. at 481, 489–90. 
 65. Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 434, 22 Stat. 341. 
 66. Parker, 577 U.S. at 489. 
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mixed.67 Though the third factor, relating to the United States’ 
subsequent treatment of the land and its demographic make-up, 
favored diminishment, the Court noted that it “ha[d] never relied solely 
on th[e] third consideration to find diminishment.”68 
The Village of Pender had, at the time of the case, approximately 
1,300 residents,69 and the purportedly diminished area of the 
reservation that includes Pender was over 99% non-Native in the year 
2000.70 Thus, Parker presented a demographic setting similar to those 
that had seemingly swayed the Court in previous cases to hold a 
reservation diminished despite weak showings of congressional intent 
in step one of the test.71 But the Court in Parker resisted the temptation 
to determine the case based on the presumed expectations of the 
non-Indians living in the area and instead proclaimed that “it is not our 
role to ‘rewrite’ the 1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic 
history.”72 
Parker, then, seemed to lay a foundation for a similar affirmance of 
reservation status in Sharp and later in McGirt.73 At the same time, 
there was considerable apprehension in the federal Indian law 
community that the exponentially larger non-Indian population on the 
Creek Reservation, including most of the roughly 400,000 people who 
live in Tulsa alone, could be viewed to foreclose, as a practical matter, 
a decision that favored the Creek Nation (which appeared as amicus 
curiae in both Sharp and McGirt).74 Many tribal advocates had all but 
 
 67. Id. at 490–92. 
 68. Id. at 492. 
 69. Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819 (D. Neb. 2014), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir), aff’d 
sub nom. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016). 
 70. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (No. 14-406). 
 71. Frickey, supra note 16, at 18–26; see also Fletcher, supra note 3. 
 72. Parker, 577 U.S. at 493–94. 
 73. Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2412 (2020) (per curiam); McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 
2452, 2464, 2469 (2020). 
 74. See Wendy Weitzel, Ruling Shifts Ground for Tribes, State, SEQUOYAH CNTY. TIMES, 
https://www.sequoyahcountytimes.com/news/ruling-shifts-ground-tribes-state [https://perma.cc/Q6NR-
RE9B] (discussing views of tribal advocates); Fletcher, supra note 3; see also Supreme Court Schedules 
Tribal Lands Case for Reargument Next Term, A.B.A.: DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION PROJECT (July 
1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2
019/summer [https://perma.cc/PRY4-96ME]; Agoyo, supra note 4. Many news articles treat the McGirt 
decision as if it actually held that the entire eastern half of Oklahoma is Indian Country. See, e.g., Wolf & 
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lost faith in the Court because of the apparent lawlessness of its prior 
diminishment and disestablishment cases and, more broadly, because 
of the Court’s extreme discomfort with the prospect of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members in the large majority of civil 
jurisdiction cases that had come before it in recent decades.75 Thus, 
despite the strength of the language in Parker and the clarity of its 
analysis, there was trepidation that the Court would retreat from it 
rather than face the prospect of potentially upsetting hundreds of 
thousands of non-Natives to preserve a tribal right.76 
B. The Majority’s Reasoning in McGirt 
The unusual measures that the Court took in Sharp, such as ordering 
further briefing on whether any federal statute granted Oklahoma 
criminal jurisdiction over the historic Creek Reservation and on the 
strawman question of whether there were circumstances under which 
land might qualify as a reservation but still not qualify as Indian 
country under 25 U.S.C. § 1151(a)77 and its holding the case over for 
reargument the following term,78 support the inference that the 
question of the continued reservation status of the Creek Nation’s 
 
Johnson, supra note 12. This is erroneous in a technical sense and is based on the assumption that if the 
Creek Nation’s reservation is still intact, those of other nearby tribes must be as well. See, e.g., McGirt, 
140 S. Ct. at 2478–79 (describing and responding to Oklahoma’s arguments in that vein). On the other 
hand, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Seminole, and Choctaw Tribes’ reservations were allotted under the same 
statutes as that of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, so these other four tribes undoubtedly have a strong 
argument that their reservations similarly remain intact. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 2). 
Indeed, Oklahoma courts have held that other reservations allotted under the same statutes do in fact 
remain intact. See generally Bosse v. Oklahoma, 484 P.3d 286 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021); Hogner v. State, 
No. F-2018-138, 2021 WL 958412 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2021). 
 75. See Weitzel, supra note 74; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 130, 135 (noting that “tribal 
assertions of power over nonmembers attract the Court’s attention” and that for Indians and tribes, “the 
numerous biases of the judiciary make every case a presumptive loser”). 
 76. The Court frequently seems to assume that non-Indians will be hostile to tribal jurisdiction, 
although that may not be the case in many circumstances and certainly would not be true for all 
non-Indians. See Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 705–06, 706 n.270. 
 77. Order Requesting Additional Briefing, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-1107.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SB3-ECCN]. The answer to this question is a simple “no,” unless one wanders far 
afield from the facts of McGirt and imagines something like a state-recognized tribe that receives a 
reservation from the state. 




Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4
2021] FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 755 
Oklahoma land set aside was indeed more difficult for the Court than 
that of the continued viability of the western section of the Omaha 
Tribe’s reservation in Parker.79 The difficulty of the decision for the 
Court is also evident from the fact that the decision in McGirt that 
finally answered the question was a 5–4 decision, in sharp contrast to 
the unanimous decision we saw in Parker.80 Indeed, even the author 
of Parker, Justice Thomas, was willing to abandon the precedent the 
case had set a mere four years later in McGirt. 
Although the McGirt Court followed the trail blazed by Parker, the 
decision is remarkable in its own right for a number of reasons. 
Moreover, in the sometimes upside-down world of federal Indian law, 
adherence to precedent is often remarkable in itself.81 This is 
particularly so in cases in the area of diminishment and 
disestablishment,82 as well as in the related area of tribal jurisdiction, 
which are difficult from the Court’s perspective because of the 
potential to both upset non-Indians’ presumed expectations and to 
interfere with state interests. 
1. The Canons of Construction in Federal Indian Law and the 
Fact that Congress, Rather than the Supreme Court, Is the 
Repository of Plenary Power 
The Court’s majority opinion in McGirt is noteworthy in its respect 
for Congress’s plenary power; instead of taking it upon itself to 
complete what it often perceives as Congress’s unfinished project of 
assimilation, the McGirt Court focuses squarely on the legislative 
intent discernible from the statute under which the Creek reservation 
was allotted.83 There are many examples where the Court, in recent 
decades, has taken it upon itself to enforce the repudiated allotment 
policy by denying a tribe jurisdiction over non-members or holding a 
reservation to have been diminished or disestablished in the absence 
 
 79. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3. 
 80. Compare McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (2020), with Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 
481, 494 (2016). 
 81. Berger, supra note 15, at 1905. 
 82. Royster, supra note 31, at 30, 37. 
 83. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462–82. 
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of clear congressional intent; and, in so holding, it sometimes invokes 
the idea that the challenged exercise of tribal sovereignty is 
inconsistent with the tribe’s dependent status.84 This approach is 
contrary to the long-established doctrine that Congress (not the Court) 
has plenary power over tribes,85 and it violates one of the core 
principles or canons of construction in federal Indian law—namely 
that “tribal rights and property rights are preserved unless Congress’[s] 
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”86 
The majority opinion in McGirt is a welcome departure from this 
approach. Instead of trying to extrapolate from and implement 
Congress’s long-repudiated policy in the present day, apparently to 
save non-members the possible inconvenience and confusion that 
could result from future exercises of tribal jurisdiction, the Court 
carefully parses the statutory language and emphasizes that Congress 
has the power to change the result should it desire to do so. Early in 
the opinion, the Court notes that, because of the legislature’s 
“significant constitutional authority when it comes to tribal relations,” 
Acts of Congress are the “only . . . place” the Court may look to 
determine if a reservation has been disestablished.87 It further explains 
that “courts have no proper role in the adjustment of reservation 
borders.”88 At another point, the majority states: “If Congress wishes 
to break the promise of a reservation, it must say so.”89 Later in the 
Court’s analysis, it elucidates the necessity of relying on the words of 
the statute and suggests that the fact that the laws being interpreted 
relate to tribes is not a license to ignore congressional intent based on 
 
 84. See, e.g., Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 674–84 (discussing jurisdiction cases); 
Tweedy, supra note 56, at 189–94 (discussing reliance on the allotment policy in the Court’s jurisdiction 
cases); Frickey, supra note 16, at 21–26 (discussing diminishment cases); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Muskrat Textualism, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 12), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767096 (describing how the Supreme Court 
sometimes intervenes without any authorization from Congress to “enforce the passivity of tribal 
governments”). 
 85. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 56, at 150; Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy 
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 163, 205, 213–14 (2002); see also Berger, supra note 19 
(manuscript at 16). 
 86. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 72. 
 87. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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concerns about the possible reactions of non-tribal citizens to a ruling 
in favor of a tribe.90 Thus, as the Court explains, consultation of 
“contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices” may sometimes be 
appropriate if they shed light on statutory meaning, but only if the 
statutory terms themselves are ambiguous.91 
It similarly emphasizes that, as the “least compelling” category of 
evidence relating to diminishment or disestablishment, evidence as to 
subsequent demographics may only be used to elucidate ambiguous 
statutory text.92 Thus, “extratextual sources” may never “overcome” a 
statute’s clear terms.93 It then buttresses this statement by explaining 
that to allow extratextual sources to overcome a statute’s plain 
meaning would be “to allow States and courts to finish work Congress 
has left undone, usurp the legislative function in the process, and treat 
Native American claims of statutory right as less valuable than 
others.”94 The reference to usurping legislative function is a clear 
invocation of the importance of the judiciary’s deference to Congress’s 
plenary power.95 By setting out this straightforward framework for 
analysis of diminishment and disestablishment questions and by 
buttressing it with a principled exegesis that ties federal Indian law 
 
 90. Id. at 2468–69. 
 91. Id. at 2468. 
 92. Id. at 2469 (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356 (1998)). 
 93. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 94. Id. at 2470 (emphasis added). 
 95. Although the Court has not been entirely consistent about the locus or loci of plenary power in the 
U.S. Constitution, plenary power has often been tied to the Indian Commerce Clause and perhaps to a 
somewhat lesser degree to the Treaty Clause. See, e.g.,  CANBY, supra note 2, at 102. Because power over 
Indian affairs has been held to be the province of Congress, a usurpation occurs when the Court arrogates 
that power to itself, and such a usurpation is properly understood as a violation of the separation of powers. 
See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: 
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 3.5 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine, in 
essence, acknowledges that in a multi-branch system of government there are limits on each branch’s 
ability to encroach on the others”); MICHAEL P. ALLEN ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND 
PROBLEMS 16 (3d ed. 2020) (noting that “on the federal level, separation-of-powers issues arise when the 
act of any one of the three federal branches (legislative, executive, or judicial) affects one or more of the 
remaining branches” and that “[t]he Framers remained faithful to ‘the political maxim that the legislative, 
executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
47 (James Madison))); see also Tweedy, supra note 56, at 150; Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at 
904. 
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decisions to other areas of law,96 the McGirt opinion appears to be 
attempting to lay a foundation for analysis in future decisions that will 
make it more difficult for the Court to depart from unambiguous 
statutory text to find diminishment or disestablishment based solely on 
steps two and three of the doctrinal test. 
The McGirt decision also reflects a nuanced view of the repudiated 
allotment policy, which is relatively rare in Supreme Court decisions.97 
As I have previously argued, to evaluate whether non-Indian settlers 
developed expectations of reservation diminishment or 
disestablishment as a result of the allotment policy and to determine 
whether any such expectations were justifiable, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that allotment, although borne out of an assimilationist 
goal, was merely one step in the process.98 Settlers were often on 
notice that the policy hit snags as it was being implemented and, in at 
least some cases, should have known that the taking of tribal lands 
constituted a violation of tribal property rights; so, courts should not 
view allotment as having constituted an enforceable promise to 
non-Indian settlers of either reservation disestablishment or freedom 
from tribal jurisdiction.99 The majority in McGirt implicitly espouses 
this line of thought when it says that “Congress may have passed 
allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to 
equate allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of 
the march with arrival at its destination.”100 This nuanced 
understanding stands in sharp contrast with the blunt view of the 
allotment policy as an indestructible assimilationist hammer that we 
 
 96. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2474 (“None of these moves would be permitted in any other area of statutory 
interpretation, and there is no reason why they should be permitted here.”); see also Berger, supra note 
15, at 1923 (describing the briefing in Parker on this question). 
 97. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 98. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 171–72; see also Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 25) (noting that 
“[t]he Dawes Act reflected a ‘policy of gradualism,’ under which Indians would be assimilated under 
federal protection and control” (quoting FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO 
ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–1920, at 52 (Bison Books 2001) (1984))). 
 99. See generally Tweedy, supra note 19. 
 100. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2465. 
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see in the dissent in McGirt, as well as in many previous Supreme 
Court cases.101 
Similarly, the Court refuses to simply assume that non-Indian 
allotment-era purchasers had justifiable expectations of reservation 
disestablishment that trump any expectations that the Creeks might 
have had as to the durability of the United States’ treaty promises.102 
Instead, the Court almost appears to respond to my earlier critique of 
the Court’s practice of simply presuming without any historical 
analysis that non-Indian settlers had justifiable expectations as to the 
diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation or as to the absence 
of tribal jurisdiction.103 
Thus, rather than assuming the existence of monolithic non-Indian 
justifiable expectations, the McGirt majority acknowledges that “some 
white settlers [may have] in good faith thought the Creek lands no 
longer constituted a reservation. But maybe, too, some didn’t care and 
others never paused to consider the question.”104 Later in the opinion, 
the majority responds to Oklahoma’s allegation that its non-Native 
citizens will be surprised to find that they live on a reservation with the 
observation that “we imagine some members of the 1832 Creek Tribe 
would be just as surprised to find them there.”105 
These acknowledgements of a probable diversity of historical views 
are startling in the context of the Court’s unimaginative body of case 
law in this area, especially given that the Court takes the possible 
expectations of Creek citizens into account as well,106 but the majority 
goes on to recognize some of the actual historical injustices to the 
Creeks that were attendant on their land loss, in that some federal 
officials in charge of implementing the law allotting the Creek 
reservation held “shares or board positions in the very oil companies 
who sought to deprive Indians of their lands.”107 The Court further 
 
 101. Id. at 2488–89 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Tweedy, supra note 19, at 137–38, 141, 143–
44. 
 102. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 137. 
 103. Id. at 131. 
 104. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2473. 
 105. Id. at 2479. 
 106. Accord Tweedy, supra note 19, at 137, 188; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 114. 
 107. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2473. 
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acknowledges that the Oklahoma courts appear to have been complicit 
in this process in that they held “sham competency and guardianship 
proceedings that divested Tribe members of oil rich allotments.”108 
This historical analysis by the Court of the injustices to the Creeks that 
were part and parcel of the allotment of their reservation feels like 
nothing less than a reckoning. Where previously the Court has often 
been unwilling or unable to seriously consider fairness questions from 
a tribe’s perspective,109 the McGirt majority’s analysis is perceptive, 
empirically rooted, and careful. 
2. Adherence to Precedent 
Another way that the majority opinion in McGirt fosters 
predictability in diminishment and disestablishment cases is by 
adhering to precedent.110 As explained above, the McGirt Court 
followed and elaborated upon the Parker Court’s affirmation that the 
proper focus in a diminishment or disestablishment inquiry is on 
statutory language.111 If the Court had instead hastily retreated from 
Parker in McGirt, as was widely feared, the Court’s jurisprudence in 
the area would have been left in a completely incoherent state. 
Thankfully, we instead have two congruent decisions four years apart 
as the Court’s most recent pronouncements in this area, and there can 
at least be a logically based hope that any subsequent decisions on 
these matters in the reasonably near future will follow the same model. 
In addition to the majority’s adherence to Parker, the Court also 
relied on much older persuasive precedent, namely a 1905 decision 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming that, 
despite Congress’s plan to abolish the Creek’s government a mere one 
year later, the Nation still had legislative and governmental powers 
until such an abolition occurred, including the power to collect taxes 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683; Frickey, supra note 16, at 26, 80; Fletcher, 
supra note 7, at 114. 
 110. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1905. 
 111. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469. 
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from non-Indians doing business within the reservation.112 As it turned 
out, of course, Congress’s plans changed, and the abolition never 
occurred. In following Parker and Buster v. Wright,113 rather than 
deciding the case irrespective of past precedent, the Court in McGirt 
seems to signal that the field of federal Indian law may be on the road 
to some level of predictability.114 If this is indeed the case, the benefits 
will be vast; uncertainties as to how cases might ultimately be decided 
in the Supreme Court have, in some cases, led to years of protracted 
litigation with proceedings sometimes occurring simultaneously in 
different fora.115 Additionally, this unpredictability has undoubtedly 
chilled tribes from attempting to enforce their sovereign rights in 
numerous instances. 
3. The Respectful Tone of the Decision 
McGirt is also fairly unusual among Supreme Court cases in the 
respectful tone it uses with respect to tribal governments, placing them 
on par with other sovereigns. Opinions that are on the less respectful 
end of the continuum are sometimes subtle and sometimes more overt 
in expressing a distrust of tribal sovereignty. For example, the opinion 
in Parker somewhat subtly frames the question of diminishment as 
whether the disputed land was “free[d] . . . of its reservation status.”116 
Because the word “free” has a positive connotation, we are left with 
the impression that not having the land be part of a reservation may be 
 
 112. Id. at 2466 (citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905)); see also Tweedy, supra note 19, 
at 178–79 (discussing Buster, 135 F. 947). 
 113. Buster, 135 F. 947. 
 114. This hope is also supported to some degree by the Court’s more recent decision in United States 
v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). In Cooley, where the Court upheld a tribal officer’s authority to detain 
and search a non-Native suspected of violating state or federal law, the Court adhered to its earlier 
statement in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990), that a tribal officer lacking criminal jurisdiction 
over a suspect could nonetheless detain the suspect and transport him or her to the state or federal 
authorities that did have jurisdiction. Cooley, 114 S. Ct. at 1644. However, the Cooley Court’s unexplained 
reliance on precedent relating to tribal civil jurisdiction in the context of a question pertaining to tribal 
criminal jurisdiction is confusing and problematic. See infra notes 179–189 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., Q&A with Snell & Wilmer’s Richard Derevan, LAW360.COM (Dec. 23, 2009), 
https://www.law360.com (search in search bar for “Q&A with Snell & Wilmer’s Richard Derevan”) 
(discussing Ford Motor Co. v. Todechenee, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 116. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481, 483 (2016) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 
(1984)). 
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the more positive outcome. Similarly, in Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,117 a tribal jurisdiction case, the 
Court casually frames the General Allotment Act itself as a positive 
development and,118 later in the opinion, suggests that a bank’s 
discrimination against a majority tribal member-owned business had 
no discernible effect on the tribe or its members.119 On the more overt 
end, in the course of upholding tribal sovereign immunity from suit, 
the majority in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc. seemed to impugn the doctrine,120 suggesting that, 
despite the fact that sovereign immunity is considered an incident of 
sovereignty for other governments (such as the federal government and 
states), for tribes, it could only be justified if they were in a weak and 
defenseless state.121  
The Supreme Court’s often disparaging view of tribes has deep 
roots. In cases in 1823 and 1831 respectively, Chief Justice Marshall 
describes the “Indians inhabiting this country [as] fierce savages, 
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly 
from the forest” and, in the next opinion pertaining to tribes, describes 
tribal citizens at the time that the Constitution was written as not 
customarily resorting to courts; rather, Chief Justice Marshall tells us, 
“[t]heir appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the government.”122 
McGirt dramatically parts company with this approach of painting 
tribes in a disparaging manner, whether explicitly or implicitly.123 
 
 117. 554 U.S. 316, 316 (2008). 
 118. Id. at 328 (“Thanks to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 
U.S.C. § 331 et seq., there are millions of acres of non-Indian fee land located within the contiguous 
borders of Indian tribes.” (citing General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 
388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)).  
 119. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 & n.156 (discussing Plains Com. Bank, 554 
U.S. 316); see also Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 332 (contrasting the discernible effect of non-member 
activities that tribes have jurisdiction to regulate with the actions at issue in that case). 
 120. 523 U.S. 751, 751 (1998). 
 121. Id. at 756–58; see also Tweedy, Indian Tribes, supra note 14, at 893; Fletcher, supra note 84 
(manuscript at 15). 
 122. Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things 
Like That?” How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687, 717–18 (2011) (first quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); and then 
quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)). For other examples of Supreme Court 
cases relying on notions of tribal savagery, see id. at 719–22. 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 719–22; McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2467 (2020). 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4
2021] FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 763 
Instead of highlighting the supposedly “anomalous” character of tribal 
sovereignty,124 the majority seems to conceive of tribes as being 
roughly on par with the state and federal governments. One prominent 
example is the majority’s drawing of a parallel between the United 
States’ selling its land to homesteaders and yet retaining sovereignty 
over the area, on the one hand, and parcels within a reservation being 
sold off and the tribe’s retention of sovereignty over the reservation 
despite these land sales on the other.125 This understanding of tribal 
sovereignty—as extending over lands within the boundaries of a 
reservation no matter who owns the individual parcels—has been 
codified in the Indian Country Statute,126 as the majority 
acknowledges;127 yet for decades, the Court has been retreating from 
the territorial conception of tribal sovereignty codified in federal law 
in favor of a consent-based conception of its own creation that is 
primarily rooted in tribal membership.128 
Another indication of the majority opinion’s positive tone with 
respect to the Creek Nation’s rights is the sanctity with which it views 
the United States’ treaty promises. For example, the opinion 
emphasizes the magnitude of what the Creeks gave up—namely, all of 
their traditional lands in the East—when they accepted the Creek 
reservation.129 It further emphasizes that they were promised that the 
new reservation would be their “permanent home” and that the federal 
government’s treaty promises to them were not “meant to be 
 
 124. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Writing for the 
Court, Justice Marshall stated: 
The status of the tribes has been described as “an anomalous one and of complex 
character,” for . . . the tribes have retained “a semi-independent position . . . not as 
States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . .” 
Id. (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973)). 
 125. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Katherine Florey, Toward Tribal Regulatory Sovereignty in 
the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 399, 432 (2021) (describing this portion of the 
McGirt opinion as “near-revolutionary”). 
 126. 25 U.S.C. § 1151(a). 
 127. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 128. See, e.g., Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 675; see also Fletcher, supra note 7, at 
125 (describing the Court’s analysis in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)). 
 129. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460–61. 
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delusory.”130 This framing poignantly demonstrates the justice of 
enforcing these treaty promises. 
At another point, the majority rejects the State’s argument that the 
federal government’s offer to the Creek Nation (which the Nation 
accepted) to provide the Nation fee title to its lands (rather than 
adhering to the federal government’s usual practice of holding the 
lands in trust) actually defeated the reservation status of the lands.131 
In rejecting this argument, the majority emphasizes the importance of 
the federal government’s promise to the Nation and the moral 
imperative that it keep its word: “[T]he State’s argument inescapably 
boils down to the untenable suggestion that, when the federal 
government agreed to offer more protection for tribal lands, it really 
provided less. All this time, fee title was nothing more than another 
trap for the wary.”132 This tone and framing represents another instance 
of the majority’s approach of illustrating the justice of enforcing the 
federal government’s promises to the Creek Nation by evoking the 
Creek Nation’s point of view to elucidate the true stakes of continuing 
to recognize the reservation. 
4. Rejecting the Use of Past Legal Wrongs As Precedent 
As I noted in previous work, there is a trope in federal Indian law 
under which the Court understands widespread, on-the-ground 
violations of a particular tribe’s land and sovereignty rights to create a 
sort of legal precedent for continued violation of those rights.133 Under 
this view, modern enforcement or recognition of the tribe’s previously 
violated rights comes to be seen as practically impossible. Not only 
does “such reasoning syllogistically and unfairly allow[] past injustice 
to serve as a basis for present injustice, thus resulting in extreme and 
 
 130. Id. at 2460. 
 131. Id. at 2474. 
 132. Id. at 2474–76. 
 133. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 130, 155 & n.134, 170. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in McGirt 
provides a vivid illustration of the use of this trope. See Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 15–16 (citing 
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2484 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
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ever increasing under-protection of tribal sovereign rights,”134 but it 
also incentivizes non-Indian individuals and even state and local 
governments to encroach upon tribal sovereignty by giving them the 
message that they may do so with impunity and that their actions will 
create a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. The majority in McGirt 
roundly rejects this backwards system. In its most concise formulation, 
the majority states that “the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to 
perpetuate it.”135 Earlier in the opinion, the majority rejects this 
approach by unpacking the absurdity of allowing a state’s violation of 
a tribe’s rights to its reservation over time to amount to legal 
evisceration of the reservation’s status: 
Under our Constitution, States have no authority to reduce 
federal reservations lying within their borders. Just imagine 
if they did. A State could encroach on the tribal boundaries 
or legal rights Congress provided, and, with enough time and 
patience, nullify the promises made in the name of the 
United States. That would be at odds with the Constitution, 
which entrusts Congress with the authority to regulate 
commerce with Native Americans, and directs that federal 
treaties and statutes are the “supreme Law of the 
Land.” . . . . It would also leave tribal rights in the hands of 
the very neighbors who might be least inclined to respect 
them.136 
Given that this is exactly how the system has worked in some previous 
diminishment and jurisdiction cases without being explicitly 
acknowledged as such, this is a remarkable line in the sand that the 
majority draws, refusing to continue to be an instrument of injustice. 
A bit later in the opinion, it reaffirms the same principle—this time 
with respect to past injustices inflicted by the federal government: 
 
 134. Tweedy, supra note 19, at 170; see also Berger, supra note 19 (manuscript at 9–10, 30–31) 
(detailing the State of Oklahoma’s historical illegal assertions of jurisdiction over the Creek Nation’s 
territory and outlining the State of Nebraska’s as well with respect to the Omaha Reservation).  
 135. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 136. Id. at 2462 (citations omitted). 
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“[I]t’s no matter how many other promises to a tribe the federal 
government has already broken. If Congress wishes to break the 
promise of a reservation, it must say so.”137 It is hard to resist the sense, 
in reading the majority opinion in McGirt, that a new day is dawning 
in federal Indian law. But it is a new day that is also an old day—one 
that hearkens back to Felix Cohen’s classic formulations, the reign of 
the rule of law, and the primacy of the canons of construction. 
C. The Dissent in McGirt 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a strong dissent in McGirt, in which he 
was joined by Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Thomas.138 Justice 
Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the 
decision below was unreviewable because it was supported by an 
independent and adequate state law ground.139 The primary dissent’s 
main focus in terms of legal analysis is on the fact that it sees the 
majority as deviating from Solem’s three-part test; specifically, Chief 
Justice Roberts accuses the majority of ignoring the latter two prongs 
of the Solem test in favor of the first prong, which focuses on statutory 
language.140 The dissent further complains that the majority views 
“each of the statutes enacted by Congress in a vacuum,” divorced from 
the “highly contextual inquiry” that the pre-Parker precedents 
reflected (although the dissent neither acknowledges nor seems to 
notice that Parker took the same approach as the majority).141 
The primary dissent is also apparently convinced by the state’s 
litany of dramatic fears recited in briefing and at oral argument, and, 
accordingly, the dissent worries that “the State’s ability to prosecute 
serious crimes will be hobbled and [that] decades of past convictions 
could well be thrown out.”142 Additionally, the primary dissent is 
convinced by the State’s argument that Congress’s partially executed 
but later abandoned plan to dismantle the Creek government somehow 
 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 2485–87 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 141. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2485–87. 
 142. Id. at 2482. 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/4
2021] FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 767 
operated to disestablish the reservation, although that is not an 
approach that is reflected in other reservation boundaries cases.143 A 
concern for justifiable expectations of non-Indians living in the area is 
also apparent in the primary dissent’s analysis, even though the 
presence of these non-Indians is in many cases attributable to the 
illegal activities of their ancestors or predecessors, as well as of federal 
and state officials.144 In contrast to the majority opinion, the tone of 
the primary dissent is cold and indifferent towards tribes, which is 
unfortunately to be expected in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions on 
Indian law.145 Thus, we see bland statements in the primary dissent 
describing horrific federal actions, such as: “In 1832, the Creek were 
compelled to cede these lands to the United States in exchange for land 
in present day Oklahoma.”146 Though seemingly innocuous on its face, 
the statement is remarkable for its utter lack of recognition as to what 
the Trail of Tears meant from the Creek’s perspective. It has the effect 
of distorting the event into one that sounds neutral, thereby implicitly 
justifying the idea that the promise of land in Oklahoma could be 
broken with impunity. A few paragraphs later, the dissent glibly states 
in reference to the promise of the Oklahoma reservation: “Forever, it 
turns out, did not last very long.”147 The statement comes off as cold 
and uncaring, and the most charitable interpretation of it is probably 
that it was written by someone who, for whatever reason, completely 
lacks the ability to imagine himself on the tribal side of the case. 
Whatever the basis or origin of the statement, it is diametrically 
opposed to the majority’s sensitive and thoughtful analysis, which also 
takes a deeper and more nuanced view of the checkered history that 
led to the current demographic situation. The dissent does respond to 
the majority’s powerful observation that the dissent’s preferred 
 
 143. Id. at 2491. 
 144. Id. at 2502; Miller & Dolan, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 145. See, e.g., Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008) (“Thanks 
to the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq., there are 
millions of acres of non-Indian fee land located within the contiguous borders of Indian tribes.” (citing 
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–
34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)).  
 146. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2483 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. 
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approach of ignoring clear text in favor of surrounding circumstances 
and subsequent history would not “be permitted in any other area of 
statutory interpretation, and [that] there is no reason why [these moves] 
should be permitted here,”148 with the unsatisfying statement that 
“disestablishment cases call for a wider variety of tools than more 
workaday questions of statutory interpretation.”149 In other words, 
apparently, Indians’ property rights are not as deserving of the same 
level of respect as others’ property rights. 
In many ways, the primary dissent treads familiar and expected 
ground. It reflects a one-sided preoccupation with non-Indians’ 
presumed understandings and entitlements and does not try to wrestle 
with tribal interests, instead leaving them almost completely out of the 
equation. The dissent also ignores the most recent precedent, Parker, 
in favor of older precedent that allows for more flexibility and better 
accommodates an outcome-determinative approach.150 The dissent 
additionally reflects how polarized the Justices are on these issues, and 
given that the decision in McGirt was 5–4, it stands for the 
precariousness of the tribal victory, especially in light of Justice 
Ginsburg’s recent passing.151 
II. MCGIRT AND THE LARGER CONTEXT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT 
CASES ON TRIBES AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 
Although the tenor of Supreme Court cases in the last several 
decades has generally been very negative for tribes, Parker and McGirt 
are not the only recent cases to have positive outcomes. In addition to 
Parker, the Supreme Court heard United States v. Bryant,152 another 
case that was a clear win for the tribes, in its 2015 term; and to some 
extent, the trend has continued in more recent cases.153 Before the two 
 
 148. Id. at 2474 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. at 2500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 150. See id. at 2486. See generally Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016). 
 151. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2458. 
 152. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). See generally Berger, supra note 15. 
 153. See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691 (2019) (finding a treaty “right to hunt on the 
unoccupied lands of the United States”); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 
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clear wins in the 2015 term, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community,154 a 2014 sovereign immunity case, stood as a the most 
recent signal that tribes may not be inevitably doomed in the modern 
Supreme Court. 
McGirt, however, remains unique in its vision of tribes as bona fide 
sovereigns that are a legitimate part of the framework of governance 
in the United States and in the combination of its eminently respectful 
tone and its subject matter. Tribal jurisdiction cases are notoriously 
hard for tribes to win, and reservation boundary cases seem to be the 
next hardest category, most likely in large part because of the potential 
jurisdictional implications of intact reservation status.155 In McGirt in 
particular, the Creek Nation seemed to have the cards stacked against 
it not only because of demographics but also because the federal 
government openly opposed its legal position that the reservation was 
still in place, a circumstance that is often fatal to a tribal claim.156 
To briefly explore some of the other recent tribal wins, Bay Mills 
was a tribal sovereign immunity case that was on all fours with 
relatively recent precedent,157 albeit precedent in which the Court had 
not enthusiastically endorsed the doctrine it applied (the 
aforementioned Kiowa Tribe case).158 Bay Mills, a 5–4 decision, 
 
1000, 1015–16 (2019) (plurality opinion) (finding a treaty right to travel that limits state taxing authority). 
See generally United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (upholding a tribal officer’s ability to detain 
and search a non-Native suspect, pending the arrival of state or federal officers). A fourth case, Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, that raised questions of tribal sovereign immunity in the context of an in 
rem quiet title action, was a wash from the tribal interest perspective in that the Court remanded the case 
for consideration of an argument raised by the non-Indian landowners for the first time in the Supreme 
Court. 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1651 (2018). A fifth case that was closely watched nationwide resulted in a 4–4 
split after Justice Kennedy recused himself, causing the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recognizing a treaty habitat right to be upheld. Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832, 1833 
(2018) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court 864 F.3d 1017 (2017). 
 154. 572 U.S. 782 (2014). 
 155. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1920, 1933–34; see also Tweedy, supra note 19, at 142–43 
(discussing City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), a case about local jurisdiction 
to tax within the boundaries of a historic Indian reservation); Royster, supra note 31, at 37 (noting that, 
as of the publication of that article, tribes had only won one case concerning diminishment or 
disestablishment in the past two decades); Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018) (ordering further 
briefing on jurisdictional issues). The Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in Cooley is a rare example of 
a tribal win in the jurisdiction context. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638. 
 156. See, e.g., John R. Hermann, American Indians in Court: The Burger and Rehnquist Years, 37 SOC. 
SCI. J. 245, 253–54 (2000); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 1939. 
 157. Berger, supra note 15, at 1910–11. See generally Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782. 
 158. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
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represented a solid (though precarious) win for the Tribe and was 
certainly more neutral in tone than Kiowa Tribe, although it still did 
not approach the level of respect in its tone that we see in McGirt.159 
For example, rather than unequivocally highlighting tribal sovereignty 
as an important basis for the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the 
Bay Mills opinion repeatedly refers to tribes using the somewhat 
depreciative “domestic dependent nations”160 language that dates back 
to 1831 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,161 and it also refers to tribes more sharply as 
“dependents . . . subject to plenary control by Congress.”162 Moreover, 
beyond tone, with the opinion’s analysis primarily focused on 
precedent and stare decisis, the opinion does not substantially add to 
the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty. 
Parker, to recap briefly, while well-written, did not evince the sense 
of respect for tribes as governments that we see in McGirt, nor did it 
examine fairness questions from the Tribe’s perspective.163 An overtly 
respectful tone regarding tribes is important in federal Indian law 
decisions because, not only does it encourage others who interact with 
tribes to treat them fairly,164 but it also undoubtedly affects the level of 
fairness to tribes in the Court’s framing of common law rules 
applicable to them. Just as decisions that employ a belittling attitude 
toward tribes and describe them in racist ways have created bad law 
 
 159. See generally Bay Mills, 572 U.S. 782; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751. 
 160. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788, 803. 
 161. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 162. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788. Professor Matthew Fletcher has described how the notion of 
dependency, although previously often evoking more of a protectorate relationship, has come to be a 
loaded term that is most often used by the Court to eviscerate aspects of tribal sovereign rights. Fletcher, 
supra note 84 (manuscript at 12, 20–25). Although Justice Kagan may not have intended to invoke that 
view in Bay Mills, references to tribes as “dependents” now unavoidably carry a great deal of baggage. 
See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788. 
 163. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 164. Cf. Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., Nos. 03-002-A & R-120-99, slip op. at 
18–19 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2004) (discussing a non-member Bank’s disrespect for 
the Cheyenne River Sioux judicial system, which it boldly articulated to the tribal appellate court during 
argument), rev’d, 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 331 (2000) (discussing the 
mixed message implicit in the tribal exhaustion doctrine and explaining how the “extreme scrutiny” it 
provides for tribal court jurisdictional determinations “encourages . . . disrespect” of tribal court 
judgments). 
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that continues to plague tribes to this day,165 we can expect the reverse 
to be true (although there have been fewer opportunities to examine 
the reverse in action): that the decisions that contribute the most to the 
jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty and that are among the fairest to 
tribes are likely to be those that adopt a respectful tone. 
The other case from that term that was a clear win for tribal interests, 
Bryant, involved the question of whether uncounseled tribal court 
convictions could constitute predicate offenses in a federal domestic 
violence habitual offender statute.166 The Court’s decision to allow the 
use of uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate offenses was 
beneficial to tribes because reservations tend to be plagued by 
domestic violence (among other types of violence against Native 
women and other Native individuals), which is often committed by 
outsiders.167 As Professor Bethany Berger has noted, the result of the 
case was very beneficial for tribes in facilitating the removal of some 
of the most egregious repeat offenders from reservations, but the 
opinion unfortunately did not focus on tribal sovereignty and comity 
as the bases for recognition of the tribal court convictions; thus it 
created some potentially bad law in the criminal arena as a result.168 
Bryant, like Parker, was therefore helpful to tribes but did not add to 
the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty, and Bryant also did not shed as 
much light as it could have on the reasons that tribal court convictions 
are deserving of respect in the federal system. 
Finally, there was a tribal loss in the 2015 Supreme Court term on 
an issue concerning equitable tolling of a statute of limitations,169 and 
there was also an extremely important tribal jurisdiction case that split 
4–4 after Justice Scalia passed away, resulting in the affirmance of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding tribal 
jurisdiction.170 Although this jurisdiction case, Dollar General Corp. 
 
 165. Tweedy, supra note 122, at 738–39. 
 166. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1961 (2016). 
 167. Id. at 1959; Berger, supra note 15, at 1926; see also Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, 
at 689–91. 
 168. Berger, supra note 15, at 1931–33. 
 169. See generally Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016). 
 170. See generally Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per 
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v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,171 was vitally important to 
tribes, as a Supreme Court decision, it lacks all precedential value.172 
Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, it does not qualify as a true 
Supreme Court win. 
Since the 2015 term, there have been some additional wins, two of 
which were in the area of treaty usufructuary rights and related treaty 
rights.173 A plurality opinion striking down a fuel importation tax as 
unlawfully burdening the Yakama Tribe’s treaty right to travel 
represents one of these treaty-rights wins.174 The other is a 5–4 
decision upholding the continued viability of the Crow Tribe’s treaty 
hunting right within the Bighorn National Forest.175 The importance of 
these two cases should not be underestimated, and the plurality opinion 
in Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. (the 
right-to-travel case) and Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion in 
Herrera v. Wyoming (the hunting case) are strongly written 
affirmances of tribal rights and both emphasize the necessity of 
treating the tribal parties fairly in light of the vast amounts of land they 
gave up based on promises that they could retain other rights.176 The 
wins in these cases, although precarious in terms of the dividedness of 
 
curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 
167 (5th Cir. 2014); Berger, supra note 15, at 1938. Another important case for Alaska Native Villages, 
although not a federal Indian law case per se, was Sturgeon v. Frost, which rejected the federal 
government’s regulatory authority over a stretch of river in Alaska under the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act. See generally 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3102(4)). 
 171. 136 S. Ct. 2159. 
 172. See, e.g., Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme 
Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 81 (2005). 
 173. See generally Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. 
Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019) (plurality opinion) (finding a treaty right to travel that limits 
state taxing authority). An additional case in which tribal interests prevailed was Patchak v. Zinke, which 
upheld a statute stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to continue to hear a landowner’s challenge to 
the federal government’s decision to take land into trust on behalf of a tribe. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). A 
fourth case, involving whether the treaty right to fish includes a right to protection of habitat, split 4–4, 
resulting in affirmance of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Tribes’ favor. 
Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court 864 
F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2017). A fifth recent case, Lewis v. Clarke, constituted a loss for tribes. 137 S. Ct. 
1285 (2017). In Lewis, a tribal employee committed an off-reservation tort while on duty, and the Supreme 
Court held that he could be sued in his individual capacity in state court notwithstanding the tribe’s 
sovereign immunity. Id. at 1293. 
 174. See generally Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (plurality opinion). 
 175. See generally Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686. 
 176. See generally Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. 1000 (plurality opinion); Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686. 
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the Court, are less unusual than the win in McGirt because tribes seem 
to be generally more likely to win in pure treaty rights cases than in 
other types of cases. For example, historically, tribes have won treaty 
usufructuary rights cases during periods when they were losing most 
other types of cases.177 And some Justices seem more amenable to pure 
tribal treaty rights claims than to tribal jurisdiction or reservation 
boundary claims.178 It is possible that this is because the exercise of 
treaty rights somehow meshes with non-Indians’ stereotypes of Native 
peoples or perhaps, more pragmatically, because the exercise of treaty 
rights does not involve any direct tribal authority over non-tribal 
citizens. At any rate, these recent treaty rights wins, although crucial 
to the maintenance of tribal cultures, are not as striking in terms of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as the win in McGirt. 
There is a post-McGirt case that yielded a remarkable result in the 
tribal criminal jurisdiction context, although the reasoning is curious 
and the language, although not disrespectful, does not exude the level 
of respect for tribal sovereignty that we see in McGirt.179 In United 
States v. Cooley,180 the Court unanimously upheld a tribal officer’s 
authority to detain and search a non-Native driver who appeared to be 
impaired, had a loaded semi-automatic weapon as well as drug 
paraphernalia with him, and had his young child in the car.181 The 
detention was allowed pending transfer to state or federal officers that 
had jurisdiction.182 The nine-page opinion rests primarily on the 
Court’s civil jurisdiction precedent without explaining why this 
precedent should be extended to the criminal context in the 
 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
 178. The late Justice Ginsburg is one example of such a Justice. Her relatively dismal early record in 
federal Indian cases did not begin to turn around until 2005. See Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to 
Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 
1014–15, 1032 (2009). She nonetheless joined the five-Justice majority in a seminal treaty rights case in 
1999. See generally Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172. 
 179. See generally United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1641; see also United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2019) (reciting the 
facts of the case), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). 
 182. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1641, 1643. 
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circumstances at hand.183 The discussion of precedent relating to tribal 
civil jurisdiction appears to be loosely based on an argument the 
United States made in its brief; specifically, the United States asserted 
that one of the exceptions to the general divestment of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members on fee lands delineated in Montana v. 
United States,184 viz the exception that allows for tribal civil 
jurisdiction where there is a threat or direct effect on tribal health or 
welfare, “reflects a general principle that supports the more modest 
ability to protect the public from imminent danger and to aid federal 
and state law enforcement.”185 Rather than spelling out that it was 
extracting a wider, general principle from the Montana case, as the 
United States advocated, the Court in Cooley appears to simply apply 
Montana in the criminal context, raising questions about whether the 
Court’s civil jurisdiction test has somehow now crept into the criminal 
context as well.186 Despite the curiousness of the Court’s analysis, the 
result in Cooley is a clear win for tribes on a jurisdictional question—
an area of law where such wins have been few and far between.187 
Although the mismatch between the legal question posed in Cooley 
and the precedent applied means that the opinion does not strongly 
further predictability in the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence,188 the 
win does suggest that McGirt may well have paved the way for 
Supreme Court decisions that are more amenable to recognizing tribal 
rights.189 
 
 183. Id. at 1641 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981), and stating without 
explanation that “[w]e believe this statement of law governs here”). 
 184. 450 U.S. 544. 
 185. Brief of Petitioner at 25–26, Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (No. 19-1414), 2021 WL 103640, at *25–26. 
 186. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1641. 
 187. Other tribal wins in the jurisdiction context include Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 188. One sense in which the Cooley decision does further predictability is in its reliance on a statement 
in past precedent to the effect that such detentions by tribal officers were allowed. See supra note 114 
(discussing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990)). 
 189. The Court decided another case dealing with tribal and Native rights in 2021: Yellen v. 
Confederation Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, Nos. 20-543, 20-544, 2021 WL 2599432 (June 25, 
2021). At issue was a technical question as to whether Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) qualify as 
“Tribal government[s]” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 9001–12, 9021–34, 9041–63, 9071–80, scattered sections of title 21 and 22 of the U.S. code, 
42 U.S.C. § 801, 33 U.S.C. § 2238b-1, 2 U.S.C. § 5548, and 17 U.S.C.A. § 710 (West 2021). Yellen, 2021 
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III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE WAKE OF JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DEATH 
Justice Ginsburg, who passed away from cancer in September 2020, 
was part of the slim 5–4 Majority in McGirt.190 While her early record 
as a Supreme Court Justice in ruling on federal Indian law cases left a 
great deal to be desired, her decisions as to tribal rights appeared to 
improve over time, particularly after apparently having reached a 
turning point in 2005.191 Though her record after 2005 remained 
mixed—for example, she disliked both tribal and state sovereign 
immunity and therefore voted against the tribe in Bay Mills192—she 
cast favorable votes for tribes in other recent cases and wrote the 
majority opinion in Bryant.193 Another indication of her apparent 
change of heart regarding tribal interests is her statement that the 
decision she most regretted was City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation,194 in which she employed colorful language to reject a tribe’s 
immunity from local taxes, insisting that the “embers” of its 
sovereignty over the area in question had “long” grown “cold.”195 
Additionally, to reach this result, she invoked the equitable defense of 
laches, which was neither briefed by the parties nor supported by the 
factual record and the application of which to federally protected tribal 
 
WL 2599432, at *2. Because there was tension between the interests of urban Alaska Natives and those 
of federally recognized tribes in the case, Brief for Cook Inlet Region, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 1–2, Yellen, 2021 WL 2599432 (Nos. 20-543, 20-544), 2021 WL 915949, at *1–2, and 
because the case solely involved a technical, statutory interpretation issue, Yellen, 2021 WL 2599432, at 
*2, it is difficult to characterize the opinion in terms whether it supports or derogates tribal and Native 
rights. 
 190. See generally McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). 
 191. Goldberg, supra note 178, at 1014–15. 
 192. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 831–32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Neither 
brand [i.e., tribal or state] of immoderate, judicially confirmed immunity, I anticipate, will have staying 
power.”). 
 193. See generally United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. 
Ct. 897, 912–13 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 
139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016–21 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle 
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 342–52 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
 194. 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Oliver O’Connell, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Greatest Regret Revealed, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-supreme-court-regret-oneida-nation-sherill-native-americans-b534565.html. 
 195. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214. 
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rights had been previously rejected.196 Although the decision itself 
remains a bitter pill for anyone who cares about tribal rights, her 
ultimate recognition of its injustice was a heartening development and 
exemplifies the fact that Supreme Court Justices sometimes do evolve 
considerably in their thinking on specific issues. Thus, despite having 
written and joined her share of poor decisions relating to tribes, Justice 
Ginsburg’s jurisprudence on tribal sovereignty had some bright spots 
and seemed to be arcing toward justice in the later stages of her career. 
Justice Ginsburg has now been replaced by Justice Barrett, a 
self-proclaimed protégé of the late Justice Scalia and a Justice whose 
views on some issues, such as gender equality, may well turn out to be 
the inverse of those of Justice Ginsburg.197 Given Justice Barrett’s 
short tenure as a judge (she was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in 2017 and previously served as a law 
professor at the conservative University of Notre Dame Law School), 
it is difficult to read the tea leaves as to how she might rule on Indian 
law cases. In light of her self-professed adherence to Justice Scalia’s 
judicial philosophy and his textualist approach,198 one clue might be 
 
 196. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 132; Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 683 n.157. 
 197. Compare Emma Brown et al., Amy Coney Barrett Served As a ‘Handmaid’ in Christian Group 
People of Praise, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2020, 8:09 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/amy-coney-barrett-people-of-
praise/2020/10/06/5f497d8c-0781-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html [https://perma.cc/PP9E-NMM5] 
(describing Justice Barrett’s former role as “handmaid” or women’s leader in a far-right Catholic group 
called “People of Praise” in which women are required to submit to their husbands and acknowledge them 
as their “heads”), with Melissa Block, Pathmarking the Way: Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Lifelong Fight for 
Gender Equality, NPR (Sept. 24, 2020, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/916377135/pathmarking-the-way-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-lifelong-fight-
for-gender-equality [https://perma.cc/X8UM-XT4K] (describing Justice Ginsburg’s considerable legacy 
of furthering gender equality); see also Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2 
Transcript, REV: TRANSCRIPTS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/amy-coney-barrett-
senate-confirmation-hearing-day-2-transcript [https://perma.cc/288A-39BR] [hereinafter Barrett 
Confirmation Hearing] (“I would say that Justice Scalia was obviously a mentor, and as I said when I 
accepted the President’s nomination, that his philosophy is mine too.”); Mary Annette Pember, Amy Coney 
Barrett and the Fate of Native Adoption Law, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 12, 2020), 
https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/amy-coney-barrett-and-the-fate-of-native-adoption-law-
4oKdAmOCKUq-HDbZ2fj5sQ [https://perma.cc/G6HL-9UC5] (explaining that People of Praise has 
been accused by past members of subjugating women). 
 198. Barrett Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197; Amy Coney Barrett: USSC Nomination 
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Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence on federal Indian law, which, as 
discussed briefly above,199 is extremely problematic for tribes. On the 
other hand, however, Justice Barrett did express openness to the Indian 
law canons in one of her law review articles,200 so there is some cause 
for hope that she may demonstrate more fidelity to precedent and core 
Indian law principles than did Justice Scalia. Her joinder of the 
unanimous opinion in Cooley is also a promising sign.201 Furthermore, 
Supreme Court Justices’ rulings on Indian law appear to be less tied to 
their conservative or liberal ideologies than their rulings in other areas, 
as well as being more likely to evolve after their appointment to the 
Supreme Court.202 
A. Justice Scalia’s Indian Law Jurisprudence As a Possible Model 
for Justice Barrett 
If Justice Barrett were to decide to follow Justice Scalia’s lead on 
cases that raise federal Indian law issues, this would undoubtedly 
foster continued unpredictability in the Court’s Indian law 
jurisprudence and would inculcate a sense of hopelessness among 
tribes and tribal advocates. As described above, Justice Scalia did not 
believe adherence to precedent was required in the field of federal 
Indian law,203 and as demonstrated by Professor Matthew Fletcher, 
despite the late Justice’s attachment to textualism, he usually failed to 
engage with the relevant texts in Indian law, instead elevating the 
interests of non-Indian opponents of tribal jurisdiction and other 
 
 199. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 200. Amy Coney Barrett, Substance Canons & Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 151–52 (2010); 
see also Memorandum from Joel West Williams, Senior Staff Att’y, Native Am. Rights Fund, on 
Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court 3–4 (Oct. 6, 2020) [hereinafter NARF 
Memorandum], https://sct.narf.org/articles/indian_law_jurispurdence/amy_coney_barrett_indian_law.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8H2E-XRGC]. 
 201. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021); see also supra notes 179–189 and accompanying 
text. 
 202. Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’s Votes on 
Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 269–72, 293 (2012). 
 203. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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sovereign rights, apparently because of a personal proclivity for, or 
identification with, such interests.204 
Justice Scalia’s record on tribal rights was poor although not 
absolutely bleak. In a study of individual Justices’ rulings in the area 
of Indian law from 1959 through 2010, Professor Grant Christensen 
found that Justice Scalia had voted for tribal interests 17.5% of the 
time.205 This was roughly the same percentage as Justice Kennedy, a 
modicum higher than Justice Thomas’s 12.2%, and a substantial 
improvement on Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Alito’s abysmal 
0%, though the latter two were quite new to the Court at that time.206 
Among Justice Scalia’s most notable votes in favor of tribal interests 
are two Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)207 cases, Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,208 in which he voted with the majority 
to enforce the statute and transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court, and 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,209 in which he partially joined Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent and penned his own dissent, with both dissents 
arguing that the majority should have applied the statute to protect the 
biological father’s parental rights.210 As to the Holyfield case, he did 
comment decades later that he found it “very hard” to follow the 
ICWA in that case, suggesting that he felt constrained to do so by the 
clear statutory language.211 Thus, even when he voted for tribal rights 
 
 204. See generally Fletcher, supra note 7; see also id. at 126 (discussing Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)). 
 205. Christensen, supra note 202, at 292. The Native American Rights Fund reports that Justice Scalia’s 
full voting record shows that he voted in favor of tribal interests only 14% of the time. NARF 
Memorandum, supra note 200, at 5. 
 206. Christensen, supra note 202, at 292. For more on Chief Justice Roberts’s disappointing record in 
the field of federal Indian law, see Peter Scott Vicaire, Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of 
Indigenous Rights in a North American Constitutional Context, 58 MCGILL L.J. 607, 644 & n.185 (2013). 
 207. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–03, 1911–23, 1931–34, 1951, 1952, 1961, 1963. 
 208. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 209. 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
 210. Id. at 667–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting, and joining dissent in part). 
 211. Adam Liptak, Case Pits Adoptive Parents Against Tribal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012), 
https://nyti.ms/WBopZV [https://perma.cc/Z4SB-PMVE]. Some have also voiced concern about how 
Justice Barrett might approach ICWA cases because she herself has adopted two children from Haiti who 
are thus of a different race and national origin from her. Pember, supra note 197. It is impossible to know 
if Barrett’s status as a white adoptive parent of Haitian children will influence her approach to ICWA, and 
unfortunately, she was not asked about the ICWA during her confirmation hearings. See Barrett 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197. One aspect of her adoption experience that may suggest that it is 
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based on statutory text, he, at least in some cases, felt ambivalent about 
it. And although his dissent in Adoptive Couple could arguably be 
chalked up to a penchant for father’s rights,212 he did vote to uphold 
tribal rights in a smattering of other cases, including his vote with the 
majority in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,213 which held the 
federal government to its statutory obligation to pay contract support 
costs under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act,214 despite Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient funds. 
Nonetheless, his slim record of cases in favor of tribal rights is 
dwarfed by his strident and unnuanced rejection of such rights in many 
others.215 One particularly troubling example is his majority opinion in 
Nevada v. Hicks,216 an opinion denying a tribal court’s jurisdiction 
over civil rights claims against state officers relating to an 
on-reservation search. Although the bare result may not be entirely 
surprising in the abstract, the opinion wreaked a good deal of collateral 
damage. The opinion is problematic in (1) seeming to extend the 
 
less likely to negatively dispose her towards the ICWA is that she and her husband did not adopt because 
of an inability to have children themselves and in fact have five biological children. Dora Nuss-Warren, 
Who Are Amy Coney Barrett’s Children?, MOMS.COM (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.moms.com/amy-
coney-barretts-children/ [https://perma.cc/2JF5-Z8TF]. Thus, she is perhaps less likely than some 
adoptive parents to be concerned that the ICWA in effect shrinks the pool of children available for 
adoption by childless couples. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and 
Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 299, 353–54 (2015) (describing the 
commodification of adoption and the increasing demand for adoptable babies by privileged, upper-middle 
class couples). In light of the Fifth Circuit’s very recent fractured en banc decision on the ICWA, it is 
possible that we will know Justice Barrett’s views on ICWA quite soon. See generally Brackeen v. 
Haaland, 994 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc). 
 212. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 136. 
 213. 567 U.S. 182 (2012). 
 214. 25 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 5301–02, 5304–08, 5321–25, 5328–32, 5345–47, 5351–56, 5361–77, 5381–99, 
5411–13, 5421–23; 42 U.S.C. § 2004b. 
 215. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 7, at 118; see also United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 
(2009) (Scalia, J., authoring the majority opinion rejecting a breach of trust claim against the federal 
government based on its covert dealings with a coal company regarding on-reservation mineral leases 
while an administrative appeal involving the Navajo Nation and the coal company was pending); Plains 
Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (Scalia, J., joining the majority opinion 
rejecting tribal court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate discrimination claims relating to an off-reservation bank’s 
treatment of an on-reservation business, the majority of which was owned by tribal members); Lyng v. 
Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Scalia, J., joining Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion rejecting tribes’ free exercise claim relating to National Forest lands); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399 (1994) (Scalia, J., joining the majority opinion finding a reservation to have been diminished based 
on “public domain” language that had not previously been recognized as a basis for diminishment). 
 216. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
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application of the extremely demanding test that must be met for a tribe 
to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-member activities on fee lands 
to tribally owned lands,217 (2) adding a grossly subjective exception to 
the requirement that litigants exhaust tribal court remedies before 
seeking relief in federal courts, (3) seeming to minimize the likelihood 
of the Court’s upholding tribal jurisdiction over non-member 
defendants, and (4) suggesting that states have considerable authority 
within the bounds of Indian country.218 It is safe to say that, if Justice 
Barrett were to follow in Justice Scalia’s shoes in the context of Indian 
law cases, it would be a disaster for Indian country. 
B. Justice Barrett’s Participation in Indian Law Cases on the 
Seventh Circuit and on the Supreme Court 
The only Indian law case Justice Barrett appears to have participated 
in as a judge on the Seventh Circuit was a per curiam case involving a 
prisoner’s statutory claim that his right to practice his Native religion 
was being infringed upon by the prison.219 It is difficult to glean a sense 
of Justice Barrett’s view of the statutory claims to free exercise of 
religion because of the procedural posture of the case. The trial court 
had at first rejected the prisoner’s claims on summary judgment, and 
the Seventh Circuit had, before Justice Barrett was appointed, reversed 
and remanded for trial.220 At trial, the prisoner had prevailed on most 
claims but, proceeding pro se, appealed on claims and issues he had 
lost—the most important of which was his contention that he was 
entitled to fresh (rather than dried) game meat for religious 
ceremonies.221 The Seventh Circuit panel, in which Justice Barrett 
participated, affirmed.222 However, given that it was the earlier 
 
 217. Id. at 374. But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian 
Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 406 (2008) (advocating for a narrow reading of Hicks that is linked to 
its specific factual context); COHEN, supra note 47, § 4.02 (same). 
 218. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra note 14, at 678–79, 684 n.159 (citing Gloria Valencia-Weber, 
The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting 
of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 407 (2003)). 
 219. See generally Schlemm v. Carr, 760 F. App’x 431 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); NARF 
Memorandum, supra note 200, at 3. 
 220. Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 221. Schlemm v. Wall, No. 11-CV-272, 2015 WL 2371944, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 21, 2015). 
 222. Carr, 760 F. App’x at 432–33. 
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appellate panel that reversed the summary judgment ruling, that the 
prisoner was proceeding pro se, that he had won most of his claims at 
trial, and that tribes and Native individuals tend to have an uphill battle 
in succeeding on religious exercise claims generally,223 his loss before 
a panel in which Justice Barrett participated does not seem remarkable. 
Accordingly, Justice Barrett’s brief judicial service on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not shed much, if 
any, light on how she might rule on Indian law issues. 
As this Article goes to press, Justice Barrett has participated in two 
cases during her six-month tenure on the Supreme Court that raise 
federal Indian law issues. The more illuminating of the two is her 
joinder of the unanimous opinion in United States v. Cooley,224 in 
which the Court upheld a tribal officer’s power to detain and search a 
non-Native criminal suspect encountered on the reservation over 
whom the tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction. Although the Court’s 
reasoning in the case is somewhat mystifying, it is a hopeful sign that 
Justice Barrett joined a decision that will have the effect of protecting 
reservation communities and tribal law enforcement from potentially 
violent criminal suspects.225 Justice Barrett’s questions during oral 
argument in Cooley were also thoughtful and searching, although she 
appeared to be assuming—at least for the purposes of her questions—
the correctness of problematic statements in prior case law to the effect 
that subjecting non-members to tribal civil jurisdiction would be unfair 
due to their lack of participation in tribal law-making.226  
The other case raising federal Indian law issues in which Justice 
Barrett participated, Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis 
Reservation,227 a statutory interpretation case, was complex in that the 
 
 223. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–79 (1990); Lyng v. 
Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 
F.3d 1058, 1071 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 224. 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). 
 225. See supra notes 179–189 and accompanying text; Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643; see also Brief of 
Petitioner, supra note 185, at 6 (discussing the threat of violence posed by the suspect in Cooley). 
 226. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–30, 59–62, Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (No. 19-1414); Tweedy, 
supra note 56, at 153, 156–60 (discussing problems with the Court’s notion that non-members generally 
should not be subject to tribal jurisdiction because, as non-members who cannot participate in tribal 
law-making, they have not “consented” to such jurisdiction). 
 227. Nos. 20-543, 20-544, 2021 WL 2599432 (June 25, 2021). 
43
Tweedy: Federal Indian Law
Published by Reading Room, 2021
782 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
interests of urban Alaska Natives were in tension with the interests of 
federally recognized tribes.228 Accordingly, her joinder in the majority 
opinion, which concluded that Alaska Native Corporations qualified 
as tribes for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act,229 does not provide a clear indication of Justice 
Barrett’s level of respect for tribal sovereignty.  
To sum up Justice Barrett’s Supreme Court jurisprudence to date, 
her participation in the unanimous Cooley decision is a positive sign. 
However, the unanimity of the decision means that her joinder does 
not elucidate where she is likely to fall in the Court’s more common, 
fractured Indian law decisions.    
C. Justice Barrett As a Judicial Clerk 
Justice Barrett undoubtedly was exposed to federal Indian law cases 
as a judicial clerk, first for Judge Silberman of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and then for Justice Scalia.230 Because of 
confidentiality rules for law clerks, however, it is impossible to know 
the extent of her role on any given case or even which cases she worked 
on that came before the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court while she 
was clerking.231 We do know that, as a clerk for Justice Scalia, she 
participated in the writing of memoranda on whether cases for which 
writs of certiorari had been filed should be taken up by the Supreme 
Court based on factors such as whether the decision was in conflict 
with cases from other federal circuits or state supreme courts.232 Thus, 
as a Supreme Court clerk, she may well have had experience 
 
 228. See supra note 189. 
 229. See supra note 189. 
 230. Amy Howe, Potential Nominee Profile: Amy Coney Barrett, SCOTUS BLOG (July 4, 2018, 2:40 
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/potential-nominee-profile-amy-coney-barrett/ 
[https://perma.cc/59QL-HHZE]. 
 231. FED. JUD. CTR., MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: ETHICS FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 
5–7 (2d ed. 2011). 
 232. Elizabeth Slattery, Amy Coney Barrett, in Her Own Words, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://pacificlegal.org/amy-coney-barrett-in-her-own-words/ [https://perma.cc/5PV2-H7FG] (reporting 
on an interview with Justice Barrett in which she describes drafting memorandums for the “cert pool”); 
NARF Memorandum, supra note 200, at 4; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The 
Certiorari Process As Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 940–42 (2009) 
(describing the cert pool process and the standards by which the Supreme Court evaluates cases for 
possible review). 
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evaluating Indian law cases for possible grants of certiorari in addition 
to experience analyzing accepted cases and potentially making 
recommendations to Justice Scalia as to how to rule on them. 
Among the small handful of Indian law cases that came before the 
Court in some fashion during Justice Barrett’s clerkship, two stand out 
as particularly notable. Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,233 
rejecting the Majority’s holding that the treaty hunting and fishing 
rights of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians remained intact. 
Additionally, the petition for a writ of certiorari in Rice v. Cayetano 
appears to have been filed during Justice Barrett’s clerkship.234 Thus, 
it is possible that Justice Barrett played a role in the Court’s decision 
to accept certiorari in that case. After Justice Barrett’s clerkship with 
Justice Scalia had ended, the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in that case and held that, under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, voting in Hawaii’s special elections for trustees 
to manage trust property for the benefit of Native Hawaiians had to be 
open to all citizens of Hawaii, rather than just to Native Hawaiians.235 
As discussed below, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 
which Justice Scalia joined, is extremely problematic for tribes, 
particularly because it would perversely erase the tribal perspective 
from the Indian law canons.236 In Rice, the Supreme Court ultimately 
sidestepped the issue of whether Native Hawaiians should be 
considered to have a special relationship to the United States that is 
similar or identical to that of tribes on the mainland.237 The Court 
decided the case, instead, based on the Fifteenth Amendment.238 
However, in so holding, the Court reversed a strong Ninth Circuit 
decision rooted in trust principles that mirror those applied in the 
 
 233. 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
 234. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818). Though Rice 
is not an Indian law case per se, cases raising issues with respect to the status of Native Hawaiians are 
analogous to those in the field of federal Indian law. 
 235. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 236. See infra note 251 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172). 
 237. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 201. 
 238. Rice, 528 U.S.at 498–99. 
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federal Indian law context.239 Thus, the dissent in Mille Lacs and the 
majority in Rice are both troubling from a federal Indian law 
perspective, but the Mille Lacs dissent is unquestionably the worse of 
the two. Again, however, we do not know whether Justice Barrett 
played any role in Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Mille Lacs 
dissent or in the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Rice. 
D. Justice Barrett’s Scholarship 
Another possible window into Justice Barrett’s approach to Indian 
law cases is any scholarship from her time as a law professor that bears 
on Indian law issues. The most likely contender in this area is the 
aforementioned law review article in which she examines canons of 
statutory interpretation and assesses whether it is proper for a textualist 
like herself to apply them (because the use of canons could potentially 
lead to an interpretation of a statute that is not closely aligned with the 
text).240 The title and theme of the article have religious (specifically 
Christian) connotations—Substantive Canons and Faithful 
Agency241—with the reference to faithfulness seeming to lend a 
religious air to the exercise of interpreting statutes as well as a 
conservative flavor to the article. 
Justice Barrett’s short section on the Indian law canons 
acknowledges that these particular canons are not a core part of her 
project because the Indian law canons originated in treaty 
interpretation rather than statutory interpretation (and her main 
concern in the article is with statutory interpretation), but nonetheless, 
her analysis seems to reflect an openness to the validity of these canons 
and a willingness to apply them or see them applied, although she stops 
short of a wholesale endorsement.242 
Justice Barrett first traces the Indian law canons back to their origins 
in the Marshall Court’s decision in Patterson v. Jenks.243 She then 
notes that, after the Court’s decision a few years later in Worcester v. 
 
 239. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 240. See generally Barrett, supra note 200. 
 241. Id. at 109. 
 242. Id. at 151–52. 
 243. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 216, 229 (1829); Barrett, supra note 200, at 151. 
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Georgia,244 which also applied the canons, the Indian law canons lay 
dormant for thirty-four years and were only applied in two additional 
cases in the nineteenth century.245 Her assertion here is that because of 
their sparse application in their early years, the canons may not have 
been as “well-settled” as the twentieth century Court understood them 
to be.246 However, besides the fact that, in privileging nineteenth 
century case law, she is also privileging the outmoded and inegalitarian 
perspectives of the white men who created it,247 in making this 
statement, Barrett importantly does not acknowledge the procedural 
obstacles that prevented tribes from suing in most cases until the latter 
part of the twentieth century.248 The fact that, for the most part, tribes 
could not get into court during the period in which she finds the use of 
the canons to be lacking is ample explanation for the apparent 
infrequency of their use during that period. However, to be fair, Justice 
Barrett makes a point of explaining that she is not saying that it is 
“wrong to apply the Indian canon to statutes,” and, importantly, she 
favorably cites the late Phil Frickey’s analysis supporting application 
of the Indian canons to statutes in a footnote.249 Given Frickey’s 
prominence as an Indian law scholar, Justice Barrett’s evident respect 
for his work is a good sign for Indian country. 
Justice Barrett’s brief discussion of the Indian law canons leaves 
one with the impression that, although she is not well-versed in Indian 
law, she may be favorably disposed towards the Indian law canons. At 
the same time, her discussion of their origin suggests that she is not 
without some level of skepticism. Although the Indian law canons do 
not figure prominently in her analysis, with respect to canons that 
apply in the context of statutory interpretation generally, she ultimately 
 
 244. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541 (1832). 
 245. Barrett, supra note 200, at 151. 
 246. Id. at 151–52. 
 247. See generally, Fletcher, supra note 7. 
 248. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 101 (7th ed. 
2020). 
 249. Barrett, supra note 200, at 152 & n.206 (citing Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. Rev. 381, 421–
22 (1993)). 
47
Tweedy: Federal Indian Law
Published by Reading Room, 2021
786 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
concludes that the use of such canons is permissible if they “promote[] 
constitutional values” in their application in a given instance.250 
As to the application of the Indian law canons, then, Justice Barrett 
is likely an improvement over Justice Scalia, who, based on his votes 
in Indian law cases, cannot be said to have been a proponent of the 
Indian law canons,251 and who failed to even mention them once in the 
book he co-authored on canons.252 
E. Concluding Thoughts on Justice Barrett 
It is hard to predict, based on the limited information we have, how 
Justice Barrett might vote in Indian law cases. Given her lack of 
experience in the area, it is also quite possible that her views as to 
Indian law and tribal rights, whatever they might be now, will evolve 
while she is on the Court. Although there is room for cautious 
optimism that she will be more respectful of and open to tribal rights 
than was Justice Scalia, how much more respectful and open she may 
be is impossible to know. She did appear humble in her answers to 
 
 250. Barrett, supra note 200, at 181. 
 251. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 218 (1999) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, which 
rejected the majority’s robust use of the canons to uphold the Tribe’s usufructuary rights against a claim 
that they had been extinguished. Id. The dissent instead suggested that the Indian law canons, which are 
supposed to privilege the Indian treaty signatory’s understanding, should only come into play if ‘“learned 
lawyers’ of the day would probably have offered differing interpretations of the [treaty language].” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 
U.S. 658, 677 (1979)). One modest counterpoint to Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Mille Lacs dissent 
was his opinion for the Court in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). That case concerned the statutory interpretation of the General Allotment 
Act, specifically whether it permitted Washington to impose ad valorem and excise taxes on allotted lands 
that the Yakama Indian Nation or its members held in fee. Id. at 254 (citing General Allotment (Dawes) 
Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 
354, 381) (§§ 331–33 repealed 2000)). The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that the 
ad valorem tax was permissible based on the Act but that the excise tax was not. Id. at 270. The opinion 
has been rightly criticized for its failure to take the Indian law canons into account with respect to the ad 
valorem tax. Royster, supra note 31, at 24. In fact, the Court could not find explicit authorization for the 
tax in the General Allotment Act, so it instead relied on a related federal statute that was not directly 
applicable to uphold the tax. Id. at 22. At the same time, however, the Court did use the canons in a 
conservative way to resolve statutory ambiguity in favor of the Yakama Indian Nation when it struck 
down the excise tax, and, in doing so, it went so far as to refer to the canons as “deeply rooted.” Cnty. of 
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 268–69. Thus, Justice Scalia cannot be said to have completely discounted the Indian 
law canons of construction, although County of Yakima appears to be an isolated example and, even so, 
is a mixed bag in terms of the canons. See generally id. 
 252. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 136. 
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questions during her confirmation hearings,253 which is probably a 
good sign, because humility is a necessity for any outsider to begin to 
understand tribal perspectives and the effects of colonial policies and 
laws on tribes and Native individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion in McGirt, when read in conjunction with the 
decision in Parker, brings much-needed coherence to the twin 
doctrines of diminishment and disestablishment. Moreover, the 
majority in McGirt was able to summon respect for tribal sovereignty 
and an understanding of the need for fairness to tribes that is seldom 
seen in Supreme Court decisions, particularly those in areas of law like 
diminishment and disestablishment that implicate tribal jurisdiction. It 
is not yet clear whether a new day is dawning for tribes in the Supreme 
Court, especially because McGirt is a 5–4 decision and one of the 
members of the majority has passed away. However, there is cause for 
at least modest hope that change is afoot. Moreover, if McGirt is any 
indication, there is a substantial possibility that the Court may realign 
itself with the canons of construction in federal Indian law, as fleshed 
out by Cohen, and return to a principled approach rooted in core 
doctrine, rather than the pell-mell methodologies we have too often 
seen in recent decades. 
 
 
 253. For example, Justice Barrett framed her answers in a way that recognized that she had not yet been 
confirmed and may not be, Barrett Confirmation Hearing, supra note 197, a contrast to Justice 
Kavanaugh’s politicized and vitriolic approach at his own confirmation hearings. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, 
Brett Kavanaugh Offers Fiery Defense in Hearing That Was a National Cultural Moment, NPR (Sept. 28, 
2018, 12:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/28/652239571/brett-kavanaugh-offers-fiery-defense-in-
hearing-that-was-a-national-cultural-mom [https://perma.cc/7R46-BAK4]. 
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